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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 900559-CA
Priority No. 2

v.
DONALD WAYNE GAMBRELL,
Defendant/Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did this Court overlook a material fact which

renders its holding that the county attorney was not covered by
the blanket bond inaccurate?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant appealed his convictions of negligent
homicide claiming that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to
the county attorney's alleged failure to provide a proper bond.
This Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction because the
Iron County Attorney was acting as de facto county attorney.
State v. Gambrell, No. 900559-CA, slip op. at 6 (Utah Ct. App.
June 26, 1991).

Additionally, the Court held that the plain

language of the blanket bond excluded the county attorney from
coverage.

Id. at 2 n.2 (copy in Appendix A ) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
No additional facts are necessary for a resolution of

the issue raised in this petition.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah law requires county attorneys to obtain "bonds"
against official delinquencies.
obtain "individual" bonds.

It does not require them to

Because the Iron County Attorney is

an employee of the insured county "who is not required by law to
furnish an individual

bond to qualify for office," the blanket

bond obtained by Iron County covers the Iron County Attorney.
INTRODUCTION
In Brown v. Pickard, denying reh'q, 4 Utah 292, 294, 11
P. 512 (1886), the Utah Supreme Court announced the standard for
granting rehearing:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court
failed to consider some material point in the
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or
that some matter has been discovered which
was unknown at the time of the hearing.
In Cumminas v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624
(1913), the Court elaborated:
To make an application for a rehearing is a
matter of right, and we have no desire to
discourage the practice of filing petitions
for rehearings in proper cases. When this
court, however, has considered and decided
all of the material questions involved in a
case, a rehearing should not be applied for,
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked
some material fact or facts, or have overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or
have either misapplied or overlooked something which materially affects the result . •
If there are some reasons, however, such
as we have indicated above, or other good
reasons, a petition for a rehearing should be
promptly filed and, if it is meritorious, its
form will in no case be scrutinized by this
Court.
-2-

The argument portion of this brief demonstrates that the State's
petition is properly before the Court and should be granted under
these standards.
ARGUMENT
THE BLANKET BOND OBTAINED BY IRON COUNTY
COVERS THE IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY UNDER THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE BOND.
The issue raised in this petition is also before this
Court in another case, State v. Sawyers, No. 910211-CA.

Attached

in Appendix B is a copy of Point I of the State's brief in that
case.
The State seeks rehearing on this issue because this
Court overlooked the use of the phrase "Individual Bond" in the
definition section of the blanket bond and failed to note that
Utah law does not require an individual bond to qualify for
office.

The outcome of this case will likely affect the bonding

of county (and possibly state) officials across the state because
the language of the bond is standardized and many elected
officials use the same surety as Iron County.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-11 (Supp. 1991) requires that
elected officials "shall execute official bonds before entering
upon the discharge of the duties of their respective offices. . .
It does not specify that they must obtain individual bonds.
Bonds of county officials are security "for official delinquencies^' nothing more.

Utah Code Ann. § 52-1-7 (1989).

There

is no reason that a blanket bond covering all county officials
cannot provide adequate protection.

-3-

Paragraph b of the blanket bond, quoted by this Court
in footnote 2 of the opinion in this case, states that an
employee covered by insuring agreements 3 and 4 is one who is not
required by law to obtain an "Individual Bond."

Because the Iron

County Attorney was required by Utah law only to provide a bond
and not an individual bond, the blanket bond obtained by Iron
County covers the county attorney.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to grant rehearing and reverse its holding that the county
attorney was not covered by the blanket bond obtained by Iron
County.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/C

day of July, 1991.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

^

/ SANDRA L'XSJOGREN
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid, to
James M. Park, attorney for appellant, 110 North Main, Cedar
City, Utah

84720, and Scott M. Burns, Iron County Attorney, P.O.

Box 428, Cedar City, Utah 84720 this

10

day of July, 1991.
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S t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

(For Publication]
Case No. 900559-CA

v.
Donald Wayne Gambrell,

F I L E D
(June 2 6 , 1991)

Defendant and Appellant.

Fifth Circuit, Cedar City Department
The Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite
Attorneys:

James M. Park, Cedar City, for Appellant
Scott M. Burns, Cedar City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson.
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Defendant appeals from his conviction of three counts of
negligent homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206
(1990). As a threshold matter he challenges the trial court's
jurisdiction and in addition challenges the court's imposition
of three consecutive sentences, one term for each victim killed
in the traffic accident. We affirm.
The basic facts are not in dispute. Gambrell was driving a
large truck loaded with 78,000 pounds of steel down a grade when
the braking system of the truck catastrophically failed.
In an attempt to stop the truck, Defendant steered it
across the opposing lane of traffic toward a hillside. As he
crossed into the opposing lane the victims came around the bend
in their vehicle. All three were killed in the ensuing crash.
Inspection of the six brakes that were not destroyed in the
accident established that none were adjusted according to
federal or state requirements. The State's expert testified
that at the time of the accident Defendant had no potential to
stop. Defendant admitted that he did not know how to adjust the
brakes and that the brakes had not been adjusted since he left
Tennessee.

An information was signed by the putative Iron County
Attorney, Scott M. Burns, and Defendant was ultimately tried by
jury. The jury convicted Defendant of three counts of negligent
homicide and the judge sentenced him to three consecutive one
year tferms in the Iron County Jail, one year on each count.
Defendant appeals his convictions. First, he claims the
Iron County Attorney who signed the information instituting
proceedings against him had not posted a bond upon taking office
and thus was without authority to file the information.
Defendant argues that because of the defective information the
court did not have jurisdiction. Second, Defendant claims the
trial court exceeded its authority under the negligent homicide
statute by imposing three consecutive sentences, one term for
each victim killed. These are questions of law and thus we
review the trial court's actions for correctness. Citv of
Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah), cert-

jtenie£,

u.s.

, i l l s. ct. 120 (1990).
I.

DE FACTO COUNTY ATTORNEY

Initially, Defendant claims that because the Iron County
Attorney, who signed the information initiating charges against
him, never filed a bond as required by Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-11
(Supp. 1990),* the county attorney was without authority to
initiate the charges. He thus argues the trial court did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case, and his convictions must be
vacated.
Defendant relies on Utah Code Ann. § 52-2-1 (1989), which
provides that an office which requires a bond becomes vacant if
the holder does not file the requisite bond within sixty days of
the beginning of his term.

1. "The board of county commissioners shall prescribe by
ordinance the amount in which the following county and precinct
officers shall execute official bonds before entering upon the
discharge of the duties of their respective offices, viz.: . . .
county attorney . . ..- Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-11 (Supp. 1990).
2. The State responds
Surety Company covered
in fact file a bond in
disagree. The blanket

900559-CA

that a blanket bond issued by Western
the Iron County Attorney and thus he did
compliance with section 17-16-11. We
bond referred to by the State

2

Whenever any person duly elected or
appointed to any office of the state or
any of its political subdivisions, fails
to qualify for such office within sixty
days after the date of the beginning of

(Footnote 2 continued)
specifically excludes any employee who is required by law to
give a bond for honesty or the faithful performance of his
duties. The bond offers two coverages: honesty and faithful
performance. Each provision excludes coverage for acts by
persons required by law to file a bond.
a. Honesty
"Employee" as used in Insuring Agreements 1
and 2 means a person while in the employ of
the Insured during the Bond Period who is

not required by law to give a bond
conditioned for the faithful performance of
his duties and who is a member of the staff
or personnel of the Insured but does not
mean the Treasurer or Tax Collector, by
whatever title known, of the Insured.

b. Faithful performance
"Employee" as used in Insuring Agreements 3
and 4 means a person while in the employ of
the Insured during the Bond period who is

not required by la** to furnish an
Individual Bond to qualify for office and
who is a member of the staff or personnel
of the Insured but does not mean any
Treasurer or Tax Collector by whatever
title known.
The State offers a letter purportedly signed by the bond
company's general counsel stating that the bond covers Mr.
Burns as the county attorney. It would be improper for us to
consider this extraneous evidence as to the intent of the
parties. The blanket bond's clear and unambiguous language
prevents the reading proposed by the State and supported by the
extraneous evidence. Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of state
Lands & Forestry. 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990). Breuer-Harrison,

Inc, v, Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah App. 1990).

900559-CA

the term of office for which he was
elected or appointed, such office shall
thereupon become vacant and shall be
filled as provided by law.
Utah Code Ann. § 52-2-1 (1989),
Defendant calls our attention to two early Utah cases to
support his position that because of the operation of section
52-2-1 the trial court lacked jurisdiction. In State v. Beddo,
22 Utah 432, 63 P. 96 (1900), the court reversed a conviction
based on a defective information signed by a purported district
attorney. The office of district attorney had been created by
a new legislative act eliminating the position of county
attorney. The court struck down the new district attorney act
as the sections of the code to be repealed were not set out in
their entirety as required by the state constitution, holding
that the district attorneys had no power to sign informations.
Appellant further supports his theory referring to State
ex rel. Stain v. Christensen, 84 Utah 185, 35 P.2d 775 (1934).
In Christensen, three men each claimed to be the State
Treasurer. Mr. Christensen had been elected treasurer in 1928,
posted bond and held the office. In 1932, Mr. Stain was
elected treasurer, but as he failed to post bond Mr.
Christensen refused to turn the office over to him. During
1932, the legislature passed the antecedent of section 52-2-1
which provides that an office becomes vacant should the holder
fail to post bond. Relying on this vacancy statute, the
governor appointed Mr. Hoge treasurer. Mr. Christensen also
refused to turn over the office to him. The court held that
Mr. Hoge was the treasurer, that Mr. Stain had never held the
office and that Mr. Christensen had properly held over until
the matter was settled but now must give up the office to Mr.
Hoge who had been appointed to the vacant office and had
complied with all of the requirements for occupying it,
including filing a bond. Some consideration was given in
dissent to the issue of de facto officers, but the majority
pointed out that Mr. Stain, Mis not, and has not been, in
possession of the office of State Treasurer.M Christensen, 84
Utah at 202, 35 P.2d at 782.
Neither case relied on by Defendant is similar to the
facts presented in this appeal. In Beddo, there was no office
to hold. The statute creating the office of district attorney
was void. In Christensen, the question was who held the office
of state treasurer, not whether the acts of the treasurer were

900559-CA
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valid. In the case before us attorney Burns assumed a
constitutionally established office and performed its functions.
We find this case more akin to Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d
124 (Utah 1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S. Ct. 1280
(1984). 3 In that case the court upheld the actions of an
administrative licensing authority even though one of its
members lacked statutory qualifications. The court concluded
that there was no jurisdictional defect because the member was
a de facto officer. The Vance court cited Hussev v. Smith, 99
U.S. 20 (1878), in its decision. In Hussev, the United States
Marshal foreclosed on and sold property in the Utah Territory
though it was later determined that he had no authority to do
so. In upholding the sales the United States Supreme Court
stated:
An officer de facto is not a mere
usurper, nor yet within the sanction of
law, but one who, colore officii, claims
and assumes to exercise official authority,
is reputed to have it, and the community
acquiesces accordingly. Judicial and
ministerial officers may be in this
position. The acts of such officers are
held to be valid because the public good
requires it. The principle wrongs no one.
A different rule would be a source of
serious and lasting evils.
Hussev, 99 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
Actions of de facto officers have been upheld in the face
of challenge in other jurisdictions under circumstances similar
to the case before us. &££, e.g.. People v. Kemolev. 205 Cal.
441, 271 P. 478 (1928) (special counsel for state who assumed
and exercised duties of public officer under authorized
appointment was an officer de facto though not taking oath of
office); People v. Montova. 44 Colo. App. 234, 616 P.2d 156
(1980) (even if ineligible as special prosecutors, members of
3. The State improperly directs us to our unpublished decision
in Elwood v. Holden, Case No. 890609-CA (Utah App. March 21,
1990). Unpublished decisions have no precedential value and
cannot be cited or used except for the purposes of applying the
doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral
estoppel. Utah Code of Judicial Administration R4-605.

900559-CA
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Attorney General's office acted as de facto officers); State v.
Jaramillo, 113 Idaho 862, 749 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1987) (if
appointment of deputy prosecuting attorney not filed, he was at
least a de facto deputy prosecuting attorney); Graaa v. State,
112 Neb. 732, 201 N.W. 338 (1924) (where not qualified, person
holding himself out as county attorney is such officer de
facto); People v. Jackson.
A.D.2d
, 558 N.Y.S.2d 590
(1990) (reversing by memorandum opinion the order of a trial
court which vacated a conviction when the prosecuting deputy
district attorney was not a member of any bar); In re G.V., 136
Vt. 499, 394 A.2d 1126 (1978) (state's attorney who failed to
file a bond is a de facto officer; her motion to terminate
parental rights conferred jurisdiction on the lower court);
Pamanet v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 501, 182 N.W.2d 459 (1971) (when a
district attorney elected in one county served two counties,
though his acts are arguably illegal as to the second county he
was an officer de facto).
Under the de facto doctrine the acts of one who assumes
official authority and exercises duties under color of a valid
appointment or election are valid where the community
acquiesces to his authority. The mere failure to comply with a
technical requirement does not void the official's actions as
to third parties and the public. The acts are valid if in the
interest of justice. Vance 671 p.2d at 131 n.5 (citing State
v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 472 (1871)).
Scott M. Burns was duly elected the Iron County Attorney.
He entered into the discharge of the duties of that existing
office, and discharged his duties for the public good. The
community acquiesced to his exercise of the duties of the
office. The only defect to Burns' holding the office de jure
was his failure to file an acceptable bond. We therefore
conclude that the filing of the information instituting
proceedings against Defendant was the valid act of a de facto
county attorney and conferred jurisdiction upon the court.
II.

MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS

Next, Defendant argues that he can be convicted and
sentenced on only one count of criminal homicide, not three, as
all of the deaths resulted from one accident. Defendant relies
on Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1990).
[W]hen the same act of a defendant under a
single criminal episode shall establish
offenses which may be punished in different
ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under
only one such provision.

900559-CA
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Defendant's argument is contrary to Utah law. The Utah
Supreme Court in State v. James, 631 P.2d 854 (Utah 1981),
held, "In crimes against the person (as contrasted with crimes
against property), a single criminal act or episode may
constitute as many offenses as there are victims." James, 631
P.2d at 855.
The Utah Court of Appeals followed James recently in State
v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Utah App. 1989). The defendant in Mane,
among other things, fired a single bullet that harmed two
people. The court specifically addressed Defendant's
contention that section 76-1-402(1) prevented his punishment
for the injury to each victim.
[T]he term "same act" as used in section
76-1-402(1) should be read in conjunction
with the latter statutory language in the
same section, pertaining to offenses under
different provisions of the code which may
be violated by a single act. As implied in
James, for example, the single act of
shooting Brown could be chargeable as first
degree homicide, negligent homicide or
manslaughter. However, the shooting of a
second victim, albeit with the same bullet,
is not an offense "which may be punished in
different ways under the different
provisions of this code," but is punishable
as a separate offense. We do not believe
that the legislature intended to preclude
greater punishment where multiple victims
exist. . . • We, therefore, hold that "act"
as used in section 76-1-402(1) includes not
only volitional acts of a defendant, but
also the number of victims, as each is
acted upon by a defendant. . . . Each
striking was an "act" constituting a
separate offense, allowing separate charges
and convictions.
Man£, 783 P.2d at 64-65.

900559-CA
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Utah's position is consistent with a large majority of
jurisdictions which specifically endorse multiple convictions
and possible consecutive punishments where there are multiple
victims of a single criminal act. £j££, e.g., People v. Lovett.
90 Mich. App. 169, 283 N.W.2d 357 (1979); Vioil v. State, 563
P.2d 1344 (Wyo. 1977), These cases, and others, are collected
in Owens, Alabama's Minority Status: A Single Conviction
Injuring Multiple Persons Constitutes Only a Single Offense, 16
Cumb. L. Rev. 85 (1985).
This principle has been applied to negligent homicide
where several persons were killed in one automobile accident.
State v. Miranda. 3 Ariz. App. 550, 416 P.2d 444 (1966)
(driver's single course of conduct can result in multiple
offenses as the killing of each person constitutes a separate
offense); Murray v. United States, 358 A.2d 314 (D.C. 1976)
(judge had power to impose consecutive sentences for negligent
homicide of two persons in a single automobile accident); State
v. Whitlev, 382 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1964) (killing of three people
in one automobile accident constituted three separate offenses
for which three consecutive sentences could be imposed).4
Defendant was properly charged and convicted for three
separate counts of negligent homicide. The imposition of
consecutive sentences on each count was within the discretion
of the trial court.
We affirm.

4. Recent cases that uphold this principle include State v.
Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1986) (overturning prior decisions
and adopting one count per victim with consecutive sentences
for each count allowable); State v. Clark, 227 N.J. Super, 204,
545 A.2d 1366 (App. Div. 1988) (when different victims are
involved there are as many offenses as individuals affected);
Ex parte Rathmell, 717 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en
banc) (death of each passenger in an automobile a complete and
distinct offense in context of involuntary manslaughter).

n AftCiiQ_rA
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APPENDIX B

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No.

910211-CA

Priority No.

v.

2

JUSTIN CHET SAWYERS,
Defendant/Appellant,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF
DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE TO A
MINOR, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (SUPP. 1990), IN.THE
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE
DAVID L. MOWER PRESIDING.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
SANDRA L. SJOGREN (4411)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
Attorneys for Appellee

WILLARD R. BISHOP
36 North 300 West
P.O. Box 279
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0279
Attorney for Appellant

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The blanket bond obtained by Iron County complied with
the statutory requirement that the county attorney be bonded.
Nothing in the statute requires the county attorney or other
county officials to obtain an individual bond.

The blanket bond

obtained by Iron County substantially complied with the law and
was not void.
The handwriting samples were lawfully obtained from
defendant after notice and upon a court order.

An order

requiring samples of one's handwriting does not violate the Utah
Constitution.
The controlled substances act is not invalidated in its
entirety under State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
This Court stated in Green that only the portion of the act that
delegated legislative authority to the United States Attorney
General was invalid.

Schedule I of the act has specifically

listed LSD as a controlled substance since at least 1971. The
inclusion of LSD was not by virtue of the United States Attorney
General adding it to the list.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE BLANKET BOND OBTAINED BY IRON COUNTY
SATISFIED THE STATUTORY BONDING REQUIREMENT.
Defendant argues in Points I and III through VII of his
brief that the prosecution in this case was invalid for various
reasons all relating back to his claim that the blanket bond
issued by Western Surety Company to Iron County either did not
-4-

cover the elected county officials or was void.

All of defen-

dant's arguments fail if the bond was valid and covered these
persons.
Utah Code Ann. $ 17-16-11 (Supp. 1990) requires that
elected county officials "shall execute official bonds before
entering upon the discharge of the duties of their respective
offices. . . . "

Defendant asserts that this statute requires

that they obtain individual bonds rather than a blanket bond.
However, nothing in the statute precludes a blanket bond.

The

plain purpose of the statute is that government be protected in
the event the surety should be called upon to provide coverage.
Bonds of county officials are security "for official delinquencies," nothing more.

Utah Code Ann. § 52-1-7 (1989).

There

is no reason that a blanket bond cannot provide adequate protection.

Defendant's insistence that the bonds be individual ele-

vates form over substance and is inconsistent with this Court's
duty to construe statutes to give effect to the legislature's
purpose in enacting them.
1251 (Utah 1989).

Crawford v. Tillev, 780 P.2d 1248,

Additionally, "[n]o bond shall be void for

failure to comply with the law as to matters of form, but it
shall be valid as to all matters contained therein, if it
complies substantially with the law."
(1989).

Utah Code Ann. § 52-1-10

The blanket bbnd substantially complied with the law.
The blanket bond issued by Western Surety Company

-5-

defines the covered employees in two ways.

The second is:

"Employee" as used in Insuring Agreements 3
and 4 means a person while in the employ of
the Insured during the Bond Period who is not
required by law to furnish an Individual Bond
to qualify for office and who is a member of
the staff or personnel of the Insured but
does not mean any Treasurer or Tax Collector
by whatever title known.
(Exhibit D-4 at 2). Western Surety states that the bond covers
the elected officials of Iron County under this definition
because they are not required by law to provide an individual
bond to qualify for office (exhibit D-10).

Western Surety

believes itself bound by the blanket bond to indemnify the
elected officials fid.).

Because the surety is bound by the

blanket bond to cover the elected officials of Iron County and
because the elected officials of Iron County were not required to
provide an individual bond to qualify for office, defendant's
arguments fail.
Defendant further asserts that § 17-16-11 requires the
county officials to sign the bond before it is valid.

It is not

clear where defendant derives this requirement but it may be from
the word "execute."

The meaning of the word execute is to carry

out or perform something.
1976 ed. at 400.

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary,

Thus, the use of the words "execute a bond"

cannot be read to mean "sign a bond" as defendant appears to
contend.
Defendant also claims that the blanket bond was not
recorded by the county recorder as required by § 17-16-11. He
asserts that this failure results in all of the county offices
•6-

being vacant under Utah Code Ann. $ 52-2-1 (1989).

However,

defendant ignores that the failure to record the bond is

a matter

of form which S 52-1-10 declares insufficient to invalidate the
bond.
Defendant also asserts in Point II of his brief that
the information was invalid because it was signed by Kyle Latimer
as Deputy County Attorney.

Defendant asserts that Latimer was

not the official deputy because his oath of office was administered by an unbonded county clerk who was, therefore, not
qualified to serve and because there was not a written appointment of Latimer on file in the clerk's office as required by Utah
Code Ann. § 17-16-7(3) (Supp. 1990).

The oath of office issue is

disposed by the preceding discussion of the sufficiency of the
blanket bond.

The lack of a written appointment on file in the

clerk's office is not fatal to the prosecution of this case.
De facto officers have been recognized by the courts of
this state.

Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, 130 (Utah 1983).

A

de facto officer is a person who claims and assumes the exercise
of official authority, who is reputed to have the authority and
to whom the community acquiesces the authority.

Ld.

De facto

officers include those who acted act under color of a known and
valid appointment but who failed to "take an oath, give a bond,
or the like."

Id. at 131 n.5. As a policy matter, courts will

validate the actions of de facto officers "because the public
good requires it[, and] [t]he principle wrongs no one."
131 (Quoting Hussev v. Smith, 99 U.S. 20, 24 (1878)).
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Id. at

The appointment of Latimer in this case was known and
valid•

The written documentation of the appointment was simply

not filed in the county clerk's office.

Thus, public policy

cries out for this Court to find that Latimer was acting as a de
facto deputy and the information signed by him was valid*
Finally, if this Court determines that the blanket bond
did not cover the elected officials of Iron County, or was void
for any of the reasons propounded by defendant, it should find
that the elected officials were acting as de facto officers. As
argued above, failure to give a bond or take an oath where there
is a known and valid election will not invalidate the actions of
the elected official.

Vance, 671 P.2d at 131 n.5.
POINT II

THE ORDER REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE
HANDWRITING SAMPLES WAS CONSTITUTIONAL.
Defendant encourages this Court to ignore the Utah
Supreme Court's holding in American Fork City v. Cosarove, 701
P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1985), overruling Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d
315 (Utah 1980).

This Court should decline the invitation

because defendant offers only an argument that Cosarove was wrong
in its decision to cast out the so-called "affirmative act
standard."

Even if this Court disagrees with the wisdom of the

Supreme Court's decision, it is bound by it.
Defendant also asserts that the order compelling him to
provide handwriting samples violated article I, SS 7 and 12 of
the Utah Constitution.

Defendant provides this Court with no

analysis of how the order was a denial of due process or an
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